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FREEZEOUT MERGER REGULATION: AN SEC RULE
JOINS STATE EFFORTS
In a corporate freezeout transaction" controlling parties exclude mi-
nority shareholders from further equity participation in the enterprise by
utilizing one of several statutorily authorized methods. 2 The inherently
' This note will use the term "freezeout" to refer to corporate transactions in which
controlling shareholders of a publicly held corporation forcibly deprive minority sharehold-
ers of future equity participation in the firm. Other terms such as going private, take-out,
squeeze-out and cash-out also refer to such transactions although such words occasionally
have more restricted meanings. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corpo-
rate Freezeouts, 87 YALZ L.J. 1354, 1365-70 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brudney &
Chirelstein].
2 See M. LnIroN & E. STMNBERGER, 1 TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS § 9.1, at 419 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as M. LnoLvN & E. STEINBERGER]. Controlling shareholders may seek to
freeze out minority shareholders for a variety of reasons. Some freezeouts are actually the
planned second step of a merger between previously unrelated firms. See text accompanying
notes 162-64 infra. Other freezeouts are corporate efforts to withdraw a security from the
public market. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen'l Indus. Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 392-93 (Del.
Ch. 1979). By ending public trading, the company may realize financial savings by sus-
pending shareholder relation and public reporting activities. Additionally, ending public
trading will lessen scrutiny by the SEC and other government agencies. Other reasons for
going private include tax benefits and greater managerial flexibility in dealing with affiliates
and subsidiaries. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-14185, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,900
(1977), reprinted in [1977] 429 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1 [hereinafter cited as 1977
Release]. Depressed stock market conditions during recent recessions have made going pri-
vate transactions financially advantageous. See Id. at E-2; Brudney, A Note on Going Pri-
vate, 61 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1019 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brudney]. Companies repurchas-
ing stock during these recessions typically had gone public during the stock market boom in
the mid and late 1960's. See, e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558
F.2d 1083, 1085 (2d Cir. 1977) (company went public at $9.00 per share in 1968 and sought
to freeze out the minority in 1974 at $2.00 per share).
The means of effecting a freezeout depend on the controlling shareholder's degree of
control and applicable state corporation laws. See M. LIPTON & E. STEiNBERGER, supra § 9.2
at 422-24. Under one common method, the controlling majority organizes a new, wholly
owned corporation and then merges the target company into the new corporation. See, e.g.,
Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977). In some states the majority may freeze
out the minority by a reverse stock split in which each outstanding share of the target
company is converted into a small fraction of a share. Under many states' law each minority
shareholder must then accept cash for the fractional share. See, e.g., Teschner v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1979) appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002
(1975). Another method of eliminating minority shareholders is dissolution of the firm ei-
ther by distribution of assets to the shareholders or by a sale of assets and distribution of
the proceeds to the shareholders. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942).
While minority shareholders have no choice but to accept a freezeout, see note 3 infra,
the transaction may actually benefit some minority shareholders. The offered price usually
exceeds current market price for the stock. Additionally, because a small group of share-
holders controls the bulk of the stock, the market for the stock may be thin or virtually non-
existent. Thus a freezeout may allow the minority shareholder an opportunity to extricate
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coercive nature of freezeout transactions3 has attracted significant atten-
tion from courts,4 commentators, 5 and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.6 Delaware courts recently have considered the appropriate
bounds for judicial scrutiny of freezeouts. 7 Meanwhile, the SEC has
promulgated rules requiring extensive disclosure of information in
freezeouts. s The recent developments raise questions concerning the re-
spective rights of controlling and minority shareholders in a corporation.9
The initial intervention of federal rulemaking into freezeouts raises the
possibility of conflict between federal and state regulation.10
A. Delaware Developments
In Delaware, present standards for scrutiny of freezeout transactions
derive from the 1977 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Singer v.
Magnavox."' In that landmark case, the court sought to eliminate trans-
actions in which corporate majorities took advantage of their controlling
position and of favorable market prices to freeze out the minority.12 The
court, relying on equity precedents, held that full compliance with statu-
tory provisions, including the long form merger statute,13 does not absolve
himself from an undesirable investment. See "Going Private" Transactions Defended at
SEC Beneficial Ownership Hearings, [1974] 280 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-8, A-8 to 9;
Letter from ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. of See. to SEC, at 15-16 (Feb. 24, 1978) (SEC File
No. 57-729) [hereinafter cited as 1978 ABA Comment Letter].
1 Corporate freezeouts usually leave targeted minority shareholders with no option but
to surrender stock at the majority's price, even though the controlling majority follows stat-
utorily mandated procedures. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1356-57; Note,
An Appraisal of Authority for the Fairness Standard Contained in the SEC's Proposed
"Going-Private" Regulations, 28 EMORY L.J. 111, 115 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Appraisal
of Authority]. In most freezeouts requiring stockholder approval, the surviving majority
controls sufficient votes to guarantee approval regardless of the vote of the frozen out mi-
nority. See note 2 supra; text accompanying notes 106-18 infra. In other going private trans-
actions, such as short form mergers, see note 27 infra, and reverse stock splits the majority
does not need stockholder approval. Thus the parties effecting the freezeout can control
both the terms offered shareholders, and the means of completing the transaction.
' See, e.g., Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Roland Int'l Corp. v.
Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (DeL 1979); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342
A.2d 566 (Ch. Div. 1975); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1977).
5 See, e.g., Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv.
987, 989-1000 (1974); Brudney & Chirestein, supra note 1 at 1354-76; Goldman & Wolfe, In
Response to A Statement of Corporate Freezeouts, 36 WASH. & LEE L. RE V. 683, 683-98
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Goldman & Wolfe].
6 See text accompanying notes 133-84 infra.
7See text accompanying notes 21-132 infra.
8 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46736 (1979), reprinted
in [1979] 515 SEc. REG. & L. REP. E-1 (to be codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3) [hereinafter
cited as 1979 Release]; see text accompanying notes 153-84 infra.
I See text accompanying notes 128-30 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 201-05 infra.
11 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
Is See note 2 supra.
" See DiL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978). Under the long form merger
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a corporate majority of fiduciary duties owed to the minority.1 ' Further,
the court did not permit the majority to dispense with the interests of
dissenting minority shareholders by use of appraisal 5 proceedings."6 A
controlling majority, under the Singer doctrine, must demonstrate that
the merger has a valid business purpose.17 Additionally, the terms of the
transaction must be entirely fair to the excluded minority.',
statute, the board of directors of each merger partner, and the stockholders of each com-
pany whose certificate of incorporation or the form of stockholder's equity will be changed
or eliminated as a result of the merger, must approve the merger. Id.
1 380 A.2d at 972; see Schell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)
(inequitable yet legal action not permissible); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, -, 5 A.2d
503, 511 (Del. Sup. 1939) (question at issue decided upon broad considerations of corporate
duty and loyalty rather than on narrow or technical grounds). Singer cited several cases that
broadly applied fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders. 380 A.2d at 976-77; see, e.g.,
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, -, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. Sup. 1952)
(majority owes minority obligation of honesty, loyalty, good faith and fairness).
15 See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (Cum. Supp. 1978). In an appraisal proceeding, a court
seeks to establish the true current value of stock belonging to a dissenting shareholder in a
long form merger, see note 13 supra, or a frozen out shareholder in a short form merger, see
note 27 infra. DEL. CODE, tit. 8, § 262; see generally Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock
Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1453 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Valuation of
Stock]. Notwithstanding the intent of appraisal proceedings to aid minority shareholders, a
judicial appraisal is often lengthy and costly. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of Dissenting
Shareholder's Appraisal Rights, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1201-03 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Vorenberg]. Further, an appraising court usually does not, or cannot, account for a frozen
out stockholder's costs in seeking an alternate investment or for the effect of capital gains
tax liability on the stockholder. See Brudney, supra note 2, at 1021; Vorenberg, supra at
1203-04.
18 380 A.2d at 977-78. Contra CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-373(f) (1961); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15 § 1515(k) (1967) (appraisal statutes are dissenting shareholders' exclusive remedy).
See also Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 1207-08. The Singer court noted that appraisal pro-
ceedings look only at the value and not the form of the shareholder's investment. Id. The
court indicated that appraisal proceedings therefore do not consider the entire fairness of
the transaction to minority shareholders. See Tanzer v. International Gen'l Indus., Inc., 379
A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977) (considering fairness only in terms of offered price is too restric-
tive); but see M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 9.3.2.2, at 441-42 (appraisal
affords adequate remedy in freezeouts).
17 380 A.2d at 976-80. The Singer court did not expressly endorse the approach of other
states, which have required a demonstration of valid business purpose in freezeouts. Id. at
976-77. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1974); Tanzer
Econ. Assoc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479-
80 (Sup. Ct. 1979). The Singer court, noting the difficulties in determining what constitutes
a valid business purpose, 380 A.2d at 975-76, simply held that a merger with the sole pur-
pose of freezing out minority shareholders violates the corporate majority's fiduciary duties.
Id. at 979-80. The Singer court's approach to valid business purpose stems partially from
the traditional notion that forced deprivation of a stockholder's right to continuing equity
participation in the firm is a deprivation of property. See 380 A.2d at 977-78. Singer did not
fully resurrect the property right concept since controlling shareholders still may freeze out
minority shareholders if a valid business purpose exists. See Tanzer v. International Gen'l
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (1977); text accompanying notes 62-63 infra. See also Rich-
ards, Protection of Majority Interests, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 728, 728 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Richards] (Singer's business purpose requirement inhibits freezeouts).
18 380 A.2d at 980. See McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of Merg-
[Vol. XXXVII
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Shortly after deciding Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court gave some
guidance concerning the business purpose requirement. The court ruled
that a majority stockholder meets the business purpose requirement even
if only the stockholder, rather than the corporation, possesses a valid pur-
pose for the transaction. 19 The court reserved judgment, however, as to
whether the Singer doctrine extends to freezeouts effected under the
short form merger statute.20 Additionally, the court offered little guidance
concerning the scope of a judicial inquiry for entire fairness or the possi-
bility of structuring freezeouts that would escape Singer scrutiny.
In recent developments, the Delaware Supreme Court has concluded
that the judicial scrutiny of business purpose and entire fairness extends
to all freezeout mergers.2 ' Chancery courts, meanwhile, have provided
only limited examination of entire fairness 22 while exempting certain
freezeouts from the Singer doctrine.2 The chancery decisions provide
corporate majorities with a chance for lessening judicial intervention into
a freezeout.2 4 The Delaware Supreme Court, however, likely will disap-
prove of measures that narrow the focus of Singer.
25
The Delaware Supreme Court extended the Singer doctrine to all
freezeout mergers in Roland International Corp. v. Najjar.26 In Roland,
Hyatt Corporation and several individuals controlling 97.6% of Roland's
stock sought to exclude the remaining 329 stockholders by effecting a
short form merger.2 7 The minority shareholders, by the terms of the
merger proposal, could either accept $5.25 in cash per share or seek judi-
ers-The Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Company, 33 Bus. LAw. 2231, 2237 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as McBride]. See also note 16 supra.
19 See Tanzer v. International Gen'l Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124; see McBride,
supra note 18, at 2238-45. The Singer decision specifically reserved the question of whether
a majority with its own valid purpose could comply with the business purpose requirement
of Singer. 380 A.2d at 980 n.. In Tanzer, the court cited several Delaware cases holding
that a majority stockholder has the right to protect his own interests so long as he violates
no duty to fellow shareholders. See 379 A.2d at 1123-24, citing, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, -, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del.
Sup. 1947). The Tanzer defendant claimed that the merger would facilitate long term debt
financing by the parent company and the court held the purpose to be valid. 379 A.2d at
1124-25. See generally M. LIProN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 9.3.3.2 at 448-49; Mc-
Bride, supra note 13, at 2238-39.
20 380 A.2d at 980; see Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241, 244 (Del. Ch. 1977).
21 See text accompanying notes 26-48 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 49-98 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 101-29 infra.
24 See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1355 (concluding that under Singer,
freezeouts are impossible to complete without judicial scrutiny).
2 See text accompanying notes 133-34 infra.
2 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
" Id. at 1033; see DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978). Under a short
form merger, a corporation holding 90% or more of the stock of another corporation may
merge the corporations without stockholder approval. The surviving corporation must notify
the minority frozen out shareholders within ten days after the merger becomes effective.
The frozen out shareholders have the option of seeking a judicial appraisal within twenty
days of receiving notice from the majority. Id.; see note 15 supra.
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cial appraisal of share value.28 Ignoring the appraisal remedy,29 a group of
dissenting shareholders filed suit in chancery court claiming the offered
price was grossly inadequate and unfair to shareholders.3 0 The defendants
answered that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action since the
validity of the business purpose and the fairness of the terms in a short
form merger are immune from judicial scrutiny.3' The chancery court, re-
lying on Singer and subsequent cases,32 concluded that a cause of action
always exists when the frozen out minority alleges exclusion from the cor-
poration as the sole purpose of a merger and thus denied defendant's
motion.3
The supreme court subsequently affirmed the chancellor's decision.s
The supreme court emphasized that Singer focused on fiduciary duty of
the majority to the minority3 5 rather than formalistic statutory adher-
ence.3s The court disagreed with the controlling shareholders who argued
that short form mergers give rise to a presumption of valid business pur-
pose.3 7 The court reiterated that demonstration of valid business purpose
26 407 A.2d at 1033.
29 See note 15 supra. The Roland minority shareholders filed suit several months after
the deadline for seeking the appraisal remedy had passed. 380 A.2d at 1039 (Quillen, J.,
dissenting). The Roland dissent suggested that appraisal proceedings would have been more
appropriate in this case and that the Singer rule should not apply where the minority seeks
nothing more than higher compensation for their holdings. Id.
21 Id. at 1037. The minority shareholders in Roland did not seek to enjoin the merger.
They only claimed unfair consideration. Id. at 1039 (Quillen, J., dissenting).
31 407 A.2d at 1034.
2 Najjar v. Roland Int'l Corp., 387 A.2d 709, 712-13 (Del. Ch. 1978).
33 Id. at 713. In the chancery court, the Roland defendants sought to distinguish the
Singer tests by claiming that the existence of both long form and short form merger statutes
evidences a legislative purpose to distinguish the types of mergers both substantively and
procedurally. Id. at 711. Because long form mergers allow shareholders to prevent the
merger whereas short form mergers do not, the Roland defendants inferred a legislative
determination that the business purpose in short form mergers presumptively was proper.
Id. The chancery court disagreed, noting that Singer extends to both the business purpose
and the fairness of the transaction. Id. at 712. Thus, even if exclusion of minority sharehold-
ers would constitute a valid purpose in short form mergers, unfair treatment of the minority
would violate the majority's fiduciary obligations.
3, 407 A.2d at 1037.
35 Id. at 1034. See text accompanying note 14 supra. The Roland court noted a corpo-
rate majority controls the corporation despite the presence of the minority's interest. 407
A.2d at 1034.
38 407 A.2d at 1034. The Roland court emphasized that a majority does not discharge
its fiduciary duty by leaving frozen out shareholders with an appraisal proceeding. Id. The
court implied that a corporate majority would time a freezeout to take advantage of a low
market price and that an appraising court would use the depressed market as the principal
valuation factor. Id. See note 15 supra.
37 407 A.2d at 1035-36. In finding no difference between fiduciary standards for short
form and long form mergers, the Roland court repeated that the fiduciary standard of
Singer arose from common law, not statutory principles. Id. at 1036; see text accompanying
notes 17-18 supra. The Roland court saw no basis for distinguishing levels of fiduciary duty
on whether the majority owns more or less than 90% of the outstanding stock. 407 A.2d at
1036; see note 27 supra.
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alone does not obviate judicial scrutiny of the entire fairness of the trans-
action.38 The court also rejected the majority's position that short form
mergers, by definition, eliminate minority challenges to the merger's
validity.39
The Roland court not only rejected exemption of short form mergers
from Singer scrutiny, but in dicta stated that the relationship between
majority shareholders and the company cannot automatically exempt a
merger from scrutiny under the Singer doctrine. 4° The court thus dis-
agreed with commentators who have advocated classifying freezeouts so
that some would be automatically exempt from the Singer tests.,1 Auto-
matic exemptions would assist corporations in the orderly planning of
freezeout transactions.4' Nevertheless, the Roland court rejected formalis-
tic classifications as contrary to the Singer position that fiduciary duty is
an aspect of all freezeout mergers.43 Thus, apparently every freezeout
merger in Delaware is now susceptible to judicial scrutiny. Because the
corporate majority has the burden under Singer of demonstrating busi-
ness purpose and entire fairness," the dissenting shareholders apparently
need only make allegations of impropriety to activate judicial scrutiny of
3 407 A.2d at 1034-35; see Tanzer v. International Gen'l Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121,
1125 (Del. 1977); text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
3" 407 A.2d at 1036. Roland overruled Stauffer v. Standard Brands, 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187
A.2d 78 (1962). 407 A.2d at 1036. Stauffer held that, absent evidence of deceit or fraud by
the majority, the frozen out shareholder's exclusive remedy in a short form merger was an
appraisal proceeding. 41 Del. Ch. at _ 187 A.2d at 79. See also Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977) (holding Stauffer inapplicable to long form mergers). The
conclusion in Roland and Singer that fairness transcends appraisal rights leaves the limits
and content of a fairness evaluation undefined. See note 49 infra.
4 407 A.2d at 1034 n.4.
41 See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1357-76; Note, Singer v. Magnavox
and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA. L. REV. 1101, 1113-21 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cash
Take-Out Mergers]. Brudney & Chirelstein classify freezeouts into three distinct categories.
One group includes those freezeouts which are actually the second step of a merger between
previously unaffiliated companies. See note 2 supra; text accompanying notes 162-64 iiifra.
These freezeouts would be exempt from judicial intervention because of the unlikelihood of
self-dealing by the majority. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1359-65. A second
category includes transactions in which a, private company which had become publicly held
seeks to return to private ownership. Brudney & Chirelstein would prohibit all such trans-
actions as inherently unfair to minority shareholders. Id. at 1365-70. The final category in-
cludes mergers between long-time affiliates. Brudney and Chirelstein advocate a case-by-
case approach to fairness in such transactions. Id. at 1370-75. But see Tanzer v. Interna-
tional Gen'l Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 389 (Del. Ch. 1979) (classified by Brudney & Chirel-
stein as merger of affiliates but also has aspects of company returning to private ownership).
See also Deutsch, Correspondence, 88 YALE L.J. 235, 236 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Deutsch] (heuristic value of Brudney & Chirelstein thesis questioned); Goldman & Wolfe,
supra note 5, at 688-98.
42 See 407 A.2d at 1034 n.4; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1357-59.
4' 407 A.2d at 1034 n.4; see text accompanying note 13 supra. But see 407 A.2d at 1038-
39 (Quillen, J., dissenting) (Roland dissent criticizing majority for mandating fairness in-
quiry because such mandating is a legislative or administrative responsibility).
" See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
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the merger.45 A court presented with allegations of majority overreaching
has the option of enjoining the merger 6 or allowing the merger to proceed
but with a hearing on fairness.47 In either instance, the additional costs
and possible delay to a proposed freezeout are considerable. Such costs
for freezeouts have led some chancellors to carve out exemptions from
Singer for certain mergers.4 The Delaware Supreme Court has yet to re-
spond to such exemptions.
A principal question left from Singer is the content and effect of a
judicial inquiry into fairness.49 In Tanzer v. International General Indus-
tries, Inc.,50 a chancellor implied that if the offered cash price for shares
considerably exceeds current market price, the majority has met the bur-
den of demonstrating entire fairness.51 In Tanzer, defendant IGI, which
had long held a majority interest in the Kliklok Corp., sought to obtain
the balance of Kliklok's stock through a long form merger.52 IGI offered
Kliklok minority shareholders $11.00 per share, the same price recom-
mended by an investment banking firm which had a potential conflict of
interest.53 This price, nearly thirty percent higher than the current mar-
ket price, exceeded Kliklok's selling price at any time in the previous
three years.5' Minority shareholders overwhelmingly approved the propo-
sal.5 5 Dissenting shareholders filed suit to seek greater compensation.
The chancellor dismissed the action holding that the complaint failed to
"' But see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 382, 389 (Del. Ch. 1979) (complaint mir-
roring Singer held not sufficient for cause of action under Singer); text accompanying notes
98-99 infra.
48 See, e.g., Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241, 245 (Del. Ch. 1977) (injunction against freeze-
out granted to allow full judicial scrutiny).
4 See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen'l Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Del.
1977).
4 See text accompanying notes 49-127 infra.
The Singer court stated that if a defendant demonstrates a valid business purpose,
the court still must consider the entire fairness of the transaction. 380 A.2d at 980. As the
basis for entire fairness, the Singer court cited Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del.
Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. Sup. 1952). 380 A.2d at 980. In Sterling the court stated that
because the defendant controlled both companies' boards of directors, the defendant bore
the burden of establishing entire fairness. 33 Del. Ch. at -, 93 A.2d at 110. The court
stated that judicial consideration of entire fairness extends to all relevant factors. Id. at ,
93 A.2d at 115.
50 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979).
" See text accompanying notes 91-93 infra.
52 402 A.2d at 389. See note 13 supra. In 1961, a predecessor of IGI acquired all of the
stock in Kliklok Corp. In 1965, IGI offered approximately 18% of the stock in Kliklok to the
public at $11.00 per share. Then in 1975, the IGI board of directors, acting on the advice of
investment bankers involved in refinancing IGI, sought to repurchase the publicly held
Kliklok stock. Id..
53 Id.
4 Id. IGI's offer to minority shareholders represented approximately 95% of book
value and was nine times the average earnings per share over the previous four years. Id.
Id. at 390; see text accompanying notes 110-16 infra.
s See Tanzer v. International Gen'l Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1122 (Del. 1977).
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state a cause of action.67 The Delaware Supreme Court, in an opinion is-
sued three weeks after Singer, held that the merger met the valid busi-
ness requirement of Singer because IGI itself possessed a valid reason for
effecting the merger." The court did not consider whether the merger was
valid for Kliklok.5 9 The court thus refused to enjoin the merger, but re-
manded the case for a "fairness hearing" to determine whether the trans-
action was entirely fair to the minority.
6 0
On remand, the chancery court admitted not knowing the criteria or
procedure for a fairness hearing. 1 The court, however, concluded that a
fairness hearing did not require a full trial.2 Rather, the chancellor deter-
mined fairness on the basis of motions for summary judgment and con-
cluded that the defendant had supplied ample uncontradicted evidence to
demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction. 3 The court scrutinized
eight factors in arriving at a finding of entire fairness."' The factors fell
into general categories concerning the structure of the transaction, 65 com-
pliance with statutory provisions,6 and the nature of the terms.
6 7
The Tanzer court, in scrutinizing the structure of the transaction,
considered the merger's purpose, alternatives to cashing out shareholders,
and the majority's financing methods. The chancellor decided that be-
cause the supreme court had found the merger's purpose to be valid, the
purpose was not unfair to the minority.68 In assessing alternatives to a
freezeout, the chancellor admitted that the majority could have offered
equity stock in the surviving corporation instead of cash .6  The court,
however, was unwilling to find such a possibility evidence of unfairness.
7 0
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1123-25.
'9 Id.; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
60 379 A.2d at 1125. The Supreme Court in Tanzer noted that the chancery court had
originally discussed the fairness of the transaction only in terms of the price offered for the
stock. Id. The court said discussion of price alone was too restrictive in light of the focus on
entire fairness of Singer and Sterling. Id.; see note 54 supra.
6' 402 A.2d at 385; see text accompanying note 49 supra.
62 402 A.2d at 385; see text accompanying notes 98-99 infra.
63 402 A.2d at 385.
" Id. at 390-95. The Tanzer defendant and plaintiff suggested the eight fairness fac-
tors considered by the court. Id. at 399.
"B See text accompanying notes 68-71 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 72-75 infra.
67 See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra.
"0 402 A.2d at 390; see text accompanying note 62 supra.
"' 402 A.2d at 390-91.
70 Id. The Tanzer plaintiffs noted that by receiving stock in IGI instead of cash, the
shareholders would not have incurred tax liability for capital gains. Id. at 390. The share-
holders also could have participated in the merged company through an exchange of stock,
and taken advantage of the merger's benefits. Id. The plaintiffs noted that stockholders also
would have avoided tax liability through a sale of corporate assets followed by a distribution
of the proceeds. Id. The chancellor concluded, however, that an exchange of stock or a sale
of corporate assets would have deprived the shareholders of appraisal rights and that stock-
holders might not wish to participate in the merged enterprise because some mergers fail.
1980]
972 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
The court also found no unfairness in IGI's financing the transaction by
using Kliklok's credit."
In evaluating the effect of applicable Delaware merger statutes on fair-
ness, the chancellor considered the availability of appraisal rights7 ' and
IGI's compliance with stockholder notice requirements .7  The chancellor
recognized that full statutory compliance does not alone insure fairness to
minority stockholders.7 ' Nevertheless, the chancellor concluded that stat-
utory compliance is an indicator of overall fairness.
75
Finally, the chancellor considered three factors concerning the terms
of the transaction. The court restricted the permissible bounds of inquiry
into the proposed terms by analogizing the fairness hearing to an ap-
praisal proceeding.7 ' As a result, the chancellor found no unfairness in the
lack of an appraisal by an independent expert 77 because such an appraisal
is not required as a matter of law.78 Further, the court refused to consider
the relevance to fairness of the ten year earlier going public price because
appraisal proceedings only consider recent market prices . 7  Finally, the
Id. at 390-91. The court admitted that drafters of future merger agreements might consider
giving frozen out shareholders the option of receiving stock in the surviving corporation. Id.;
cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1101-1101.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (requiring that in most
freezeouts corporations offer to convert shares in old corporation to shares in new
corporation).
71 402 A.2d at 393. The Tanzer court noted that the frozen out minority shareholders
would have no interest in Kliklok after the merger. Id. The court thus reasoned that
Kliklok's obligation to repay a loan after the merger did not harm the minority. Id.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 392.
7" Id. at 393; see text accompanying note 36 supra.
75 402 A.2d at 392-93.
71 See text accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
77 Id. at 391. See text accompanying note 53 supra. The Tanzer court confronted a
potential conflict of interest by IGI's outside appraiser. The appraiser's fee depended on
successful completion of long term corporate refinancing, including the merger. 402 A.2d at
391. Retaining a truly independent appraiser, however, would have delayed the proceedings
as the new appraiser familiarized himself with the company. See Richards, supra note 17, at
729-30. The court's expedient solution overlooked possible unfairness to minority
shareholders.
78 402 A.2d at 391. Delaware statutory merger law does not require that outside groups
appraise the fairness of the transaction to the minority. See DEL. CODE, tit. 8, §§ 251, 253,
262 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978); but cf. SEC Release No. 34-11231, 40 Fed. Reg. 7947 (Feb. 6,
1975), reprinted in [19751 289 FED. SEC. L. REP. (BNA) E-1 [hereinafter cited as 1975 Re-
lease] (federal freezeout rules originally required two independent appraisals of fairness).
Additionally, good faith reliance on experts will not excuse the board of directors from lia-
bility to stockholders for unfairness. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249
A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968). Expert opinion, however, enhances the majority's credibility
in fairness proceedings. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Co., 413 A.2d 137, 147 (Del. 1980) (invest-
ment banker's testimony utilized in judging fairness); Richards, supra note 17, at 728-31.
7, 402 A.2d at 392-93; see, e.g., Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 281, 194
A.2d 50, 53-54 (1963) (using average market price on day before tender offer). In appraisal
proceedings market price is one indicator of current perceptions of the stock's value. See In
re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 419, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (Del. Sup. 1965). In the
Tanzer fairness proceeding, however, the plaintiff asked the court to consider the earlier
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court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the frozen out minority
should share the financial savings and benefits of the merger.8 0 The court
noted that appraisal proceedings do not award financial benefits from a
merger to frozen out shareholders.8 '
The Tanzer court's evaluation of factors in three different areas af-
fecting fairness appears, at first impression, to fulfill the Delaware Su-
preme Court's command to consider the entire fairness of the transaction
to the minority.8 2 The factors cover a range of possible abuses of minority
interests by a corporate majority." Because the parties selected the fac-
tors as appropriate to this particular transaction,8 4 a complete considera-
tion of fairness required inquiry into this transaction's relevant facts. The
court, however, made no such factual inquiry into the merger and instead
decided the case on the basis of motions for summary judgment.
8 5
Because a court may render summary judgment only on the basis of
questions of law,88 the Tanzer court faced a dilemma. The court had little
law on which to base a decision because virtually no precedent exists re-
garding the criteria for entire fairness.8 7 The court instead established
fairness law by drawing analogies to statutory appraisal proceedings.88
However, analogizing a fairness hearing to an appraisal proceeding was
inappropriate. Since an appraisal proceeding does not fully protect frozen
out minority shareholders,8 9 a fairness hearing should go beyond both the
offering price of the stock as evidence of the fairness of the controlling shareholder's activi-
ties, not of the stock's value. 402 A.2d at 392. Thus by ignoring the offering price, the court
was ignoring the plaintiff's allegations that IGI had benefitted from current market condi-
tions at the expense of minority shareholders. See note 2 supra; text accompanying notes
87-90 infra.
80 402 A.2d at 393-95. But see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977) (portion of merger's financial benefits allocated to sharehold-
ers); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers & Takeovers, 88 IHRv. L.
REv. 277, 310-15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirestein, Fair Shares] (frozen
out shareholders should share in a synergistic benefits of merger).
81 402 A-2d at 394-95; see DEL. CODE, tit. 8, § 262(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978). See also text
accompanying notes 88-90 infra. The Tanzer chancery concluded that if synergism was a
factor in a fairness hearing, the 29% premium over market price offered for the shares cov-
ered any possible synergistic effect. 402 A.2d at 494. See text accompanying notes 87-90
infra.
8 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
" 402 A.2d at 390-95.
' Id. at 390. The Tanzer court admitted that commentators have suggested other fac-
tors for judging fairness but that such factors were not appropriate in this case. Id. at 395.
See, e.g., Delaware Chills Freeze-outs: A Critical Brief of Singer v. The Magnavox Com-
pany and Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 426, 438-39
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Critical Brie].
95 402 A.2d at 385-86.
"Id. at 385.
87 See note 49 supra. The Tanzer decision is the only reported Delaware fairness hear-
ing involving a freezeout merger. Cf. Lynch v. Vickers, 402 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. Ch. 1979) (fair-
ness hearing in context of tender offer).
" See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
89 See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
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substantive and procedural contexts of an appraisal hearing. The court
should consider any factor bearing on the fairness of the transaction.
Only an unconstrained fairness inquiry can protect shareholders in a for-
malistically proper yet ultimately inequitable merger.
The Tanzer chancellor partly refused to inquire into the facts of the
transaction because he concluded the plaintiffs would not benefit from
such inquiry.9 1 The chancellor presumed that any benefits from factual
inquiry were already a part of the premium above market price offered
for the stock.9 2 This presumption is premised on the niarket price accu-
rately reflecting corporate value with the premium merely representing a
bonus to minority stockholders. The Delaware Supreme Court, however,
has rejected market price as a universally dependable indicator of freeze-
out value.9 3 Thus, no basis exists for the court's presumption. In order to
consider properly the plaintiff's allegations of unfairness the court should
have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Only at trial
could the court have fuly examined the plaintiff's allegations.
9 4
The chancery court's Tanzer decision, if upheld by the Delaware Su-
preme Court,95 will aid corporate majorities in future freezeouts. The
court's analogies to appraisal proceedings will limit the extent of future
inquiries into the terms of a transaction. 6 Under the Tanzer precedent, a
court would only consider the unfairness of a freezeout if an appraisal
proceeding would consider the question.9 7 Additionally, the court's grant-
ing the defendant's summary judgment motion 8 indicates that future
plaintiffs will need to present prima facie evidence of unfairness, rather
than general allegations, in order to prevent summary judgment.9 9 Fi-
nally, the court's presumption that a larger premium relieves the need for
detailed judicial scrutiny will aid corporate majorities in supporting sum-
See note 49 supra.
91 The Tanzer court cited the existence of a premium over market price in considering
the relevance of the stock's price history and in deciding whether the frozen out sharehold-
ers deserved a share of merger generated benefits. 402 A.2d at 393, 395; see text accompany-
ing notes 79-81 supra.
91 402 A.2d at 395; see Rothschild, Going Private, Singer, and Rule 13e-3 What Are the
Standards for Fiduciaries?, 7 SEc. REG. L.J. 195, 211-12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Rothschild].
93 See, e.g., In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, -, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (DeL
Sup. 1965) (market price not sole element in stock appraisal).
" See Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). The Kemp court, in granting a
preliminary motion to enjoin a freezeout, concluded that only at trial can a court carefully
scrutinize the testimony on entire fairness of a transaction. Id. at 245. See also Lynch v.
Vickers, 402 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. Ch. 1979) (ten day trial offered ample opportunity for fairness
hearing).
"1 The Tanzer plaintiff has appealed the case. See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407
A.2d 1032, 1038 n.6 (Quillen, J., dissenting).
" See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
97 See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
" See 402 A.2d at 385-86.




mary judgment motions. 00 Plaintiffs will have to counter such a pre-
sumption with evidence that the defendant's unfairness is so gross as to
exceed the amount of the premium.
A recent chancery decision has gone even further than did Tanzer"'0
in alleviating the threat of shareholder lawsuits and judicial intervention
in a freezeout. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 02 a chancery court held that
a properly structured freezeout causes the burden of proof during judicial
scrutiny to shift from the majority to the minority.103 The chancellor's
decision conflicts with the Delaware Supreme Court's broad use of equity
to protect all freezeout victims.10'
In Weinberger, defendant Signal Companies, which owned 51% of
UOP, sought to acquire all of UOP's stock through a long form merger.10
5
Signal structured the merger so that approval was contingent on a
favorable vote by a majority of the voted minority shares. 06 Furthermore,
the minority vote in favor of the merger plus the Signal shares needed to
aggregate two-thirds of all outstanding shares. 0 7 The voting minority
shareholders approved the" merger by a twelve to one margin, easily meet-
ing both requirements. 08
Plaintiff Weinberger, a dissenting minority shareholder, filed a class
action suit against Signal.109 The plhintiff alleged that the merger's sole
purpose was to eliminate outside shareholders and that, therefore, the
merger lacked a valid business purpose." 0 Further, the plaintiff alleged
that the terms of the merger, including the offered price, were unfair."
The chancellor dismissed the compalint for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion under Singer even though the complaint mirrored the Singer com-
plaint." 2 The Weinberger court read Singer to state that the majority's
fiduciary duty arises only from the majority's ability to control the minor-
100 See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra; cf. Temple v. Combined Properties Corp.,
410 A.2d 1375, 1378-80 (DeL Ch. 1979) (discouraging summary judgment motions for plain-
tiffs in freezeouts).
101 See text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
102 409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979); see generally Ward & Welch, Majority's Ability to
Structure Mergers Improved by Weinberger Case, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 14, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
102 409 A.2d at 1267-68; see text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.-
104 See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1033-34 (Del. 1979); Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-80 (Del. 1977); text accompanying notes 122-26 infra.
105 409 A.2d at 1264. Signal offered minority shareholders $21.00 per share, a price that
Lehman Brothers, an investment banking firm, thought fair. Id.
10" Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1265.
109 Id. at 1263. The chancery court initially found that only minority shareholders who
dissented in the vote belonged to the eligible class of plaintiffs. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
No. 5642, slip op. at 13 (Del. Ch., Apr. 5, 1979) (class action certification proceeding); cf.
DEL. CODE, tit. 8, § 262(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (only dissenting shareholders may participate
in appraisal proceeding).
110 409 A.2d at 1265.
"I Id.
212 Id. at 1264, 1267.
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ity's property.113 The court thus reasoned that since the majority no
longer controlled the destiny of the merger, the majority could not exer-
cise its power in abuse of the minority."" The majority thus had no
fiduciary duty to the minority and no obligation to demonstrate the
Singer requirements of business purpose and fairness.11 5 The court ad-
mitted that a freezeout merger contingent on approval by a majority of
the minority was not immune from judicial scrutiny.116 Rather, unlike
Singer where the corporate majority had an initial burden of demonstrat-
ing fairness and business purpose, the dissenting minority now had the
initial burden of proving fraud or deception.111
The Weinberger facts contained little evidence of actual majority
overreaching or unfairness to the minority.1128 The court, however, elected
not to decide the case on the merits and consequently rule as a matter of
law that Signal had fulfilled the Singer tests of business purpose and fair-
ness. 1 " Rather, the court stated broadly that any freezeout contingent on
approval by a majority of the minority renders Singer inapplicable.1 0 Ap-
11 Id. at 1265.
"I Id. at 1265-66. See text accompanying notes 124-25 infra.
115 409 A.2d at 1266. The Weinberger court admitted that the plaintiff's complaint also
alleged a violation of fiduciary duty based on Signal's voting its shares in favor of the
merger. Id. The court noted, however, that Signal's vote would have been insufficient to
force the merger because of the minority vote requirement. Thus, even though Signal could
have stopped the merger, Signal had no fiduciary obligation to do so because the minority
was not vulnerable to the majority's whims. Id.
16 Id. at 1267. Only Weinberger type mergers involving fraud or deception are subject
to judicial scrutiny. See text accompanying notes 122-24 infra.
"I Id. at 1267-68. By requiring the objecting stockholder to demonstrate fraud by the
controlling majority, the Weinberger court adopted the business judgment rule. See FOLK,
THE DELAWARE GEmRAL CORPORATION LAw, 75-81 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FOLK]. In
mergers with little chance for self-dealing by the surviving company, the business judgment
rule is the standard for reviewing the defendant's actions. See id. at 335. The business judg-
ment rule places an almost impossible burden on the objecting shareholders to prove corpo-
rate impropriety. See id. at 336. The Singer court, in recognizing the inherent self-dealing in
a freezeout merger, required the corporate majority to prove the fairness of its actions. 380
A.2d at 980; see Tanzer v. International Gen'l Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 386-87 (DeL Ch. 1979).
I' In Weinberger, relatively little chance of fiduciary breach existed. While Signal con-
trolled both boards of directors, Signal owned barely half of UOP's stock indicating that an
ample public market existed for the stock. See text accompanying note 107 supra. Addition-
ally, the minority stockholder's approval vote was by a sizable 12-1 margin. 409 A.2d at
1265. Finally, the original stockholder's complaint failed to make specific allegations of un-
fair actions or fiduciary breaches. Id. at 1267. In an amended complaint following discovery,
the Weinberger plaintiff made several allegations concerning specific fiduciary breaches by
the corporate majority. 409 A.2d at 1267. The court did not answer whether such alleged
breaches are specific enough to cause judicial scrutiny of the transaction. Rather, the court
ignored the allegations because they did not appear in the original complaint. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
"0 409 A.2d at 1268; see note 117 supra. The Weinberger decision conflicts with two
earlier chancery decisions holding that minority approval does not alter judicial scrutiny. In
neither earlier decision, however, was the merger's success contingent on the minority vote.
See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968); Stryker
& Brown v. Bon Ami Co., No. 1945, slip op. at 4 (Del. Ch., March 16, 1964). See also Bas-
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proval of the merger by the minority would certainly be one indicator of a
merger's fairness. Because eliminated minority shareholders are most af-
fected by a freezeout, their approval indicates at least tacit acceptance of
the merger proposal.121 Nevertheless, the chancellor's presumption that
minority approval automatically renders Singer inapplicable ignores the
Delaware Supreme Court's position that the inherent coerciveness of all
freezeouts necessitates special judicial scrutiny.1 22 This special scrutiny
includes consideration of a merger's entire fairness not just evidence of
fraud or deceptiveness by the majority.123 Yet, without fraud or decep-
tiveness, dissenting shareholders in a Weinberger freezeout have only
statutory appraisal as a remedy.' 2 4 Singer concluded that appraisal pro-
ceedings are insufficient protection for frozen out shareholders. 25 If the
Delaware Supreme Court is to continue emphasizing the inherently coer-
cive nature of freezeouts and the resultant necessity of close judicial scru-
tiny, the court should overturn Weinberger.12 6 If the court upholds Wein-
berger, parties seeking to effect freezeouts will have a method of
significantly reducing the risk of judicial intervention in a freezeout.
27
Roland, Tanzer and Weinberger are all judicial efforts to apply the
broad equitable principles of Singer to particular freezeout mergers. The
chancery decisions in Weinberger and Tanzer add certainty to this area
of corporate law by establishing means of precluding judicial scrutiny for
controlling shareholders effecting freezeout mergers.228 Delaware courts
previously have held that the existence of merger statutes evidences a
legislative intention that courts should tolerate and even encourage merg-
ers.129 Singer and Roland tempered that encouragement by emphasizing
tian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 682 (Del. Ch. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 278 A.2d 467 (Del.
1970); FOLK, supra note 117, at 338-39; Richards, supra note 17, at 731-33. When the merger
is not contingent on the minority vote, minority shareholders have less incentive to vote
because the majority's dominant voting position guarantees aproval of the merger. See Rich-
ards, supra note 17, at 733.
Courts judging self-dealing corporate transactions other than mergers have held that
ratification of the transaction by a majority of the minority shareholders shifts the burden
of proving impropriety to the dissenting minority. See Richards, supra note 17, at 731; see,
e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224-25 (Del. 1979) (ratification by majority of mi-
nority shareholders of stock option plan benefitting corporate officers shifted burden of
proving impropriety to objecting shareholder); Schiff v. RKO Pictures Corp., 34 DeL Ch.
329, -, 104 A.2d 267, 271-72 (1954) (approval of sale of assets by majority of minority
shifted burden to dissenting minority).
121 See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunbill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968)
(approval by majority of minority entitled to consideration in evaluating fairness but does
not shift burden of proof).
122 See text accompanying notes 11-18 supra. See also text accompanying note 3 supra.
123 See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
114 See note 15 supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
126 The Supreme Court could affirm Weinberger on its facts. See note 119 supra.
127 See text accompanying notes 128-32 infra.
118 See text accompanying notes 114-18 & 91-93 supra.
" See, e.g., Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 684 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd per
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that full compliance with proscribed procedures does not lessen the ex-
tent of judicial scrutiny of freezeout mergers.8 0 The tendency in Wein-
berger and Tanzer to revive proscribed procedures for mergers conflicts
with the equitable shareholder protections emphasized in Singer.""' Until
corporate majorities are able to make strong equitable arguments to pro-
tect majority interests, the Delaware Supreme Court will limit the availa-
bility of Weinberger and Tanzer for future freezeouts.'3 '
B. Federal Regulation
The Securities and Exchange Commission recently adopted Rule 13e-
313 requiring disclosure of certain information by companies proposing to
freeze out minority shareholders. 34 The adopted rule, however, does not
include a previously proposed requirement that freezeouts be fair to mi-
nority shareholders.'38 The absence of a substantive fairness requirement
has eliminated much of the rule's effectiveness in protecting minority
shareholders. 38 Adoption of the rule nevertheless exposes freezeout
transactions to both federal and state scrutiny and control.1
37
The SEC has considered regulating freezeouts for several years 38 pur-
suant principally to authority in section 13(e) 39 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act ('34 Act).' 4 0 In 1975 the SEC proposed two versions of Rule
curiam, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970); MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172,
178, 157 A. 396, 398 (1928). See also FOLK, supra note 117, at 331-33.
130 See text accompanying notes 14-16 & 36-39 supra. See also Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439-40 (1971) (granting injunction to delay annual meeting even
though plaintiffs did not meet strict time limits).
131 See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra. See also Deutsch, supra note 43, at 621-
22 (arguing that formalistic rules in corporate law are too inflexible to deal with intricacies
of corporate law and that such rules invite abuse and circumvention).
,31 See Richards, supra note 17, at 728.
133 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1980).
134 1979 Release, supra note 8, at E-1.
See text accompanying notes 144-52 infra.
138 See text accompanying note 186 infra.
137 See text accompanying notes 189-94 infra.
11 See SEC Release No. 33-5526, 39 Fed. Reg. 33,835, as amended by 39 Fed. Reg.
41,222 (Sept. 9, 1974), reprinted in [1974] 268 SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) D-1, D-3 (first SEC
proposal concerning freezeout regulation). See also Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr. at Notre
Dame Law School, November, 1974, reprinted in [1974] 278 SEc. REG. L. REP. (BNA) D-1,
D-2 to 3 (suggestion by SEC Commissioner of need to regulate freezeouts).
139 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976).
140 Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111
(1976 & Supp. II 1978)). Section 13(e) was added to the '34 Act as part of the Williams Act
of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454. See generally Brown, The Scope of the
Williams Act and its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAW. 1637 (1971). Under § 13(e), the SEC
has the power both to define fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts and to prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent such acts involving repurchase of registered securities
by issuers. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1976). The Act specifically permits the SEC to order
repurchasing issuers to disseminate any information which the SEC deems material to a
shareholder's decision of whether to sell the security. Id. Congress originally extended the
requirements of § 13(e)(1) to all purchases by affiliates of issuers, but in 1970 amended the
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13e-3. 14 1 Both versions required extensive disclosure by companies pro-
posing freezeouts. 142 One version also required that a company proposing
a freezeout have a valid purpose for the transaction and that the terms of
the transaction be fair to the minority.143 In 1977 the SEC issued a re-
vised proposal requiring both disclosure and substantive fairness, but not
a valid business purpose.1 4 4 The SEC asserted that statutory authority
existed for substantive regulation of freezeouts even though most federal
securities regulations cover only disclosure of information. 45 The Com-
mission distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green1 46 which found that manipulation or deception by the
controlling majority is a necessary element of a federal cause of action for
unfairness in a freezeout.1 47 The SEC noted that the Supreme Court had
decided Green under Section 10(b) of the '34 Act 148 and not Section
13(e). 49 Section 13(e), in additin to prohibiting manipulation and decep-
tion, forbids frauds in securities transactions.15 0 Implying that unfair
merger terms are also fraudulent, the SEC concluded that its statutory
authority included the power to regulate fairness.1 51 Numerous commen-
tators, however, disagreed with the SEC's broad interpretation of what
constitutes fraud. 152
provision to give the SEC discretion in exempting certain purchases by affiliates of the se-
curity issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(2) (1976).
The SEC also promulgated Rule 13e-3 under the authority in other sections of the '34
Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b) (SEC power to define terminology), 78j(b) (prohibiting manipu-
lative or deceptive devices in security transactions), 78n(a) (governing proxy solicitation),
78n(c) (disclosure in proxy solicitation), 78w(a) (general rule making procedures) (1976).
141 1975 Release, supra note 78, at E-1.
141 See id. at E-2 to 3.
143 See id. at E-6. But see Letter from ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Secur-
ities to SEC, at 3 (July 18, 1975), reprinted in J. FLOM, M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, 2
TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS-TmER OFFEas AND GOING PRIVATE, at 113, 115 (1976) (criticiz-
ing 1975 proposal as inappropriate and vague).
114 See 1977 Release, supra note 2, at E-1 to 17.
145 Id. at E-5 to 8.
146 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
147 1977 Release, supra note 2, at E-7; see 430 U.S. at 474-78. See generally Sherrard,
Federal Judicial & Regulatory Response to Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE
L. Rzv. 695 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sherrard].
148 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. I 1978).
149 1977 Release, supra note 2, at E-7. See Note, Fairness In "Going Private" Transac-
tions: Federal Authorization Of Substantive Regulation, 58 B.U.L. REv. 792, 808-09 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Authorization]. The Supreme Court in Santa Fe took notice of
the SEC's 1975 proposal for Rule 13e-3, see text accompanying notes 143-45 supra, but
declined to consider whether the SEC had authority to promulgate going private rules under
sections of the Securities Exchange Act other than § 10(b). 430 U.S. at 473 n.12.
'5 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976); 1977 Release, supra note 2, at E-7.
See id. at E-6 to 7; Appriasal of Authority, supra note 3, at 142.
181 See 1979 Release, supra note 8, at E-1. See, e.g., Sherrard, supra note 147, at 724;
Note, SEC Proposed "Going Private" Rule, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 184, 213-15 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Proposed Rule]; Appraisal of Authority, supra note 3, at 142; 1978 ABA Com-
ment Letter, supra note 2, at 7-8. But see Federal Authorization, supra note 148, at 810-14
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The adopted version of Rule 13e-3 covers transactions by a security
issuer 6 3 or affiliate'" designed to terminate public trading in the secur-
ity. 55 The existence of fewer than 300 public shareholders and the delist-
ing of the stock from all security exchanges are indicators of an end to
public trading. 58 Listed means of ending public trading include large re-
purchases of stock, 57 and tender offers. 58 The rule also covers proxy so-
licitations and information dissemination in connection with a statutory
merger or consolidation159
The rule exempts certain transactions where the minority is less likely
to suffer unfairness or where other federal laws regulate the transac-
tion.16 0 A principal exception is for two-step mergers.'' In a two-step
(arguing Congress intended broad meaning of "fraud" and thus unfairness is within defini-
tion of fraud).
1, See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(8) (1976). Rule 13e-3 applies both to securities registered under
§ 12 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976), and securities subject to § 15(d) of the '34 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1976). 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3(b), (c) (1980).
15 Rule 13e-3(a)(1) defines an affiliate as a person, including a corporation, who di-
rectly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with the security issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(1) (1980). Delaware
courts have not said whether Delaware freezeout protections extend to transactions effected
by a controlling but not majority shareholder. See Rothschild, supra note 92, at 225.
15 1979 Release, supra note 8, at E-2.
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(4)(ii) (1980). In response to public suggestions, the SEC
changed the effects characterizing transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 from the 1977 Propo-
sal. See 1979 Release, supra note 8, at E-2. The original proposal would have scrutinized
those transactions which would delist a stock from a national security exchange even if an
over-the-counter market for the stock still existed. Id. The SEC, however, did not alter
language in the 1977 Proposal stating that the rule covers transactions which have a "rea-
sonable likelihood or a purpose of producing" the end of public trading or reporting require-
ments. Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(1)(4) (1980). The SEC disagreed with commentators
that the requirement of finding either "a reasonable likelihood" or "a purpose" that the
transaction would cause the end of public trading was overly subjective. 1979 Release, supra
note 8, at E-2. The Commission concluded that more objective standards would invite cir-
cumvention of the rules. Id.
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(4)(i)(A) (1980).
14 Id. § 240.13e-3(a)(4)(i)(B).
15 Id. § 240.13e-3(a)(4)(i)(C).
160 Id. § 240.13e-3(g) (1980).
161 Id. § 240.13e-3(g)(2). The Rule 13e-3 exception for two-step mergers covers those
transactions in which the person effecting the transaction became an affiliate of the security
issuer, see note 154 supra, through a tender offer in the previous year. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
3(g)(2) (1980). Further, the original tender offer must have disclosed the offeror's intention
of eventually merging the companies. Id. Also, the present transaction has to occur in a
substantially similar manner to the method disclosed. Id. As a final protection for stock-
holders frozen out in exempted two-step transactions, Rule 13e-3 requires that frozen out
stockholders receive at least as much compensation as did stockholders during the tender
offer. Id.
While a purchaser taking the two-step merger exemption does not have to file a poten-
tially burdensome disclosure statement, the exemption may prove troublesome for the pur-
chaser. If a targeted stockholder knows in advance that the purchaser will offer at least as
much compensation in a final freezeout as in the original tender offer, the stockholder will
have less incentive to accept the original tender offer. Further, while § 14d(7) of the '34 Act
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merger, a previously unaffiliated company buys a significant stake in the
target company through voluntary sales of stock by stockholders. The ac-
quiring company then freezes out the remaining shareholders. 1 2 Com-
mentators have compared two-step mergers to arms length mergers be-
tween unaffiliated companies where self-dealing is less likely than in true
freezeouts.116 Rule 13e-3 also exempts transactions where the shareholder
may continue equity participation in the surviving corporation rather
than accept cash for his shares."" Allowing the stockholder to continue
ownership in the surviving corporation lessens the coerciveness of the
transaction. 165 The rule also exempts transactions which are part of bank-
ruptcy proceedings,166 transactions described in the terms of the secur-
ity, 1 6 7 and transactions involving public utility holding companies. s
The principal requirement for complying with Rule 13e-3 is the prepa-
ration of a Schedule 13E-3 transaction statement.6 9 The person propos-
ing the transaction must file the statement with the SEC and disseminate
pertinent information to stockholders. 17 0 Schedule 13E-3 resembles other
SEC disclosure statements required in most transactions affecting corpo-
protects early tendering stockholders from later increases in tender price, the protections
extend only so long as the tender offer has not expired. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976). Thus if
an acquiring company might give greater compensation in a freezeout than in the original
tender offer, the stockholder has even less incentive to accept the original tender offer. See
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 80, at 337.
142 See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
163 See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1359-65; Cash Take-Out Mergers,
supra note 41, at 1113-15. Commentators in favor of exempting two-step mergers from state
and federal freezeout regulation argue that the acquiring company is, in essence, an outsider
throughout the transaction. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1361. As an out-
sider, the acquiring company owes no traditional fiduciary duty to the other shareholders.
Id. But see Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 5, at 692-94 (state fairness protection needed in
two-step mergers because little other protection for stockholders). See also Roland Int'l
Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 n.4 (DeL 1979) (rejecting exemption of two-step merg-
ers from judicial scrutiny for freezeouts); text accompanying notes 40-43 supra; note 192
infra.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(2) (1980). Rule 13e-3 requires that the replacement security
be either common stock or stock with substantialy the same voting, dividend, redemption,
liquidation and other rights as the original security. Id. § 240.13e-3(g)(2)(i). Further, the
replacement security will be subject to SEC registration and reporting requirement unless
an exemption applies. Id. § 240.13e-3(g)(2)(ii).
165 See note 3 supra. The SEC stated that transactions in which the stockholder re-
ceives a new equity security are beyond the scope of the rule. In such transactions stock-
holders may maintain an equivalent or enhanced equity interest in the firm. 1979 Release,
supra note 8, at E-3; see note 3 supra.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(5) (1980). Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act governs reor-
ganizations and solicitations of stockholder votes during reorganizations. See 11 U.S.C. §§
1101-1174 (Supp. H 1978).
167 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(4) (1980).
1- 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(3). The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 gov-
erns transactions involving certain public utilities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976).
'a' 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(d) (1980). See id. § 240.13e-100.
170 Id. §§ 240.13e-3(d), (e), (f).
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rate control. 7 ' Most of the schedule consists of objective data on the
terms and nature of the proposed transaction. 72 The issuer or affiliate
must disclose, for instance, recent contracts involving the security,
7
1
financial data on the issuer,'17 and the outcome of pertinent votes by the
board of directors on the proposal.
7 5
Three items in Schedule 13E-3, however, attempt to give the solicited
shareholder a perspective on the substantive fairness of the transac-
tion.17 The issuer or affiliate must reveal the existence and contents of
any outside appraisal of the transaction's fairness. 7 7 Also, the issuer or
affiliate must disclose the purposes, alternatives and effects of the trans-
action. 78 Finally, the issuer or affiliate must comment on the fairness of
the transaction to the minority. 79 The fairness comment must include
information on the value of the company, 80 the security's price history'8 '
and the contingency of the transaction upon approval by a majority of
the minority shareholders.
8 2
In addition to disclosure requirements, Rule 13e-3 imposes a 20 day
waiting period on freezeouts to allow dissemination of information and
full consideration of the proposal by targeted shareholders.' 3 The rule's
17 See id. §§ 240.13d-1 to 102 (disclosure of purchasers of more than 5% of equity
stock in company); id. §§ 240.13e-4, 101 (disclosure in tender offers by securities issuers); id.
§§ 240.14a-1 to 102 (disclosure in solicitation of proxies); id. §§ 240.14c-1 to 101 (disclosure
in distribution of information in advance of corporate votes); id. §§ 240.14d-1 to 101 (disclo-
sure in solicitation of tender offers by outsiders); Rothschild, supra note 92, at 219.
17 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1980).
173 Id. § 240.13e-100, Item 11.
174 Id., Item 14.
175 Id., Item 12.
178 See id., Items 7, 8, 9. Rule 13e-3 requires that the purchaser list the three fairness
items separately from the other disclosed information in a prominent Special Factors sec-
tion of the disclosure document. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e)(3)(i) (1980). The SEC thus is
stressing the importance of the information on fairness in shareholder decisions. See text
accompanying notes 176-77 infra. See 1979 Release, supra note 8, at E-4.
S177 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 9 (1980). The disclosure statement must include infor-
mation on the appraiser, the appraiser's method, and the contents of the appraisal. Id. Fur-
ther, the rule requires the appraisal must be available for inspection. Id.
178 Id. Item 7.
17 Id. Item 8. The requirement of an extensive discussion of the factors affecting fair-
ness is the principal addition to Schedule 13E-3 from the 1977 proposal. 1979 Release, supra
note 8, at E-5. Rule 13e-3 requires the acquiring party to reveal the extent to which each of
the fairness factors affected the transaction proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 8(b)
(1980).
180 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 8(b) (1980).
181 Id.
18 Id., Item 8(c). See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262, 1268 (Del. Ch. 1979)
(freezeouts contingent on approval of majority of minority shareholders exempt from judi-
cial scrutiny); text accompanying notes 101-29 supra. The party proposing the transaction
must also disclose whether a majority of the issuer's unaffiliated directors approved the
transaction and whether the unaffiliated directors retained outside counsel to represent the
frozen out shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Items 8(d), (e).
13 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(f)(i) (1980). See 1979 Release, supra note 8, at E-4 to 5. The
waiting period does not apply to tender offers because other SEC rules govern disclosure in
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other protection for minority shareholders -is a general prohibition of
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with
most freezeout transactions.18
While the adoption of Rule 13e-3 represents a specific SEC effort to
address the problems of frozen out shareholders, the regulation actually
provides little new protection to shareholders. Other SEC rules and fed-
eral securities laws already regulate many of the transactions under the
scope of Rule 13e-3.185 Further, disclosure alone provides little protection
to shareholders.1 8 Many shareholders lack the time or knowledge or di-
gest the information in a disclosure statement, and the influence or re-
sources to organize opposition to management proposals. Protection is
further hindered because the SEC may. enjoin an unfair freezeout only if
the disclosure statement is false or incomplete.8 7 Also, the burden of en-
forcement apparently falls entirely on the SEC staff because of recent
Supreme Court decisions which have severely restricted private causes of
action under federal securities laws.188
Recent trends in state scrutiny of freezeouts also limit the effective-
ness and necessity of -Rule 13e-3.181 The SEC proposed regulating
freezeouts before many state courts demonstrated an interest in protect-
ing frozen out minority shareholders.9 0 Subsequent state litigation has
established and expanded minority protections, so that today state regu-
tender offers. See id. See also, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(e) (1980) (tender offers by issuers); id.
§ 240.14d-1 (tender offers by other than issuers).
184 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(b)(1) (1980). Rule 13e-3's prohibition of fraudulent, deceptive
or manipulative acts or practices does not apply to securities registered under § 15(d) of the
'34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1976). 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(c) (1980); see text accompanying
note 197 infra. See generally 11 A, Part 1 Business Organizations, E. GADSBY, FDERA
SEcUTRrEs EXCHANGE AcT oF 1934 § 4.02 at 4-59.
185 See Rothschild, supra note 92, at 218; 1978 ABA Comment Letter, supra note 2, at
4; text accompanying note 171 supra.
18s The SEC recognized that without regulation of fairness the 1977 proposed rules
would not prevent injustice to frozen out shareholders. 1977 Release, supra note 1, at E-3.
The degree of knowledge of the transaction possessed by the minority is largely irrelevant in
stopping the merger because corporate majorities usually can guarantee approval. See Brud-
ney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1369 n.28 (disclosure may help dilute majority vote but
will not abort insider controlled merger); Proposed Rule, supra note 154, at 195 (Rule 13e-3
will accomplish little if based on disclosure alone); cf. 1978 ABA Comment Letter, supra
note 3, at 4 (disclosure requirements of Rule 13e-3 so burdensome as to suggest real purpose
is to defer freezeouts); but cf. 1979 Release, supra note 8, at E-6 (SEC concluded disclosure
costs for securities issuers far outweighed by benefits to security holders).
1s7 See Rothschild, supra note 92, at 218-19 (questioning SEC's authority to take action
for false disclosure where disclosure was immaterial to success of transaction).
18 See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245-47
(1979). See also Note, Section 17(a) of the '33 Act: Defining the Scope of Antifraud Protec-
tion, 37 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 859, 866-76 (1980); text accompanying note 196 infra.
18' See Note, Assuring Fairness in Corporate Mergers: Recent State Trends, 35 WAsH.
& LFE L. REv. 927, 933-47 (1978).
I" The Delaware Supreme Court decided Singer v. Magnavox Co. in 1977, two years
after the SEC first proposed freezeout rules. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
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lation is often broader than the new federal protection.191 Not only do
state standards regulate the substantive fairness of freezeouts, but the
state protections apply to more transactions. For instance, Rule 13e-3
exempts two-step mergers while the Delaware Supreme Court has specifi-
cally included such transactions in Delaware standards. 9 2 The federal
rule governs only transactions involving certain registered securities while
state protections presumably extend to all companies incorporated in the
state. 93 Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that fair-
ness involves all aspects of the transaction, while the federal rules specify
only certain factors that bear on fairness.9
The SEC has proposed to Congress two measures that would expand
the scope of Rule 13e-3.195 One proposal allows private enforcement of
certain sections of the '34 Act including section 13(e). 9 6 The second pro-
posal gives the SEC rulemaking authority to prevent frauds or deceptions
involving certain securities not presently within the Commission's author-
ity.' 97 While both proposals would expand federal regulation of
freezeouts, neither proposal addresses the fundamental issue of whether
the SEC possesses statutory authority to regulate the substantive fairness
of freezeout transactions. 99  Commentators have been vehement and
nearly unanimous in declaring that the SEC presently lacks authority to
regulate fairness. 9 9 Any commission rulemaking on fairness would likely
fail judicial scrutiny based on a lack of statutory authority.
200
Congressional approval of expanded SEC authority which would cover
substantive freezeout regulation is politically unlikely. Freezeout protec-
tions fall within the scope of fiduciary relationships which state govern-
ments traditionally have regulated.20' Some commentators have advo-
cated increased federal regulation of- corporate behavior. 02  Many
181 See Rothschild, supra note 92, at 222-23; text accompanying notes 192-94 infra.
While numerous state courts -have considered the equities of freezeout mergers, only Wis-
consin has adopted statutes governing going private transactions. See 11 Wis. ADMUN. CODE
§ SEC 6.05 (1977) (provision for disclosure of certain information about transaction and
regulation of substantive fairness of transaction); Appraisal of Authority, supra note 3, at
126-28.
192 See text accompanying notes 40-43 & 161-63 supra.
193 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3(b), (c) (1980).
194 See text accompanying notes 18 & 179-82 supra.
195 See Proposed Amendments to Williams Act, [1980] 542 SEc. REG. L. REP. 1, 19-20
(Special Supplement) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments].
19 Id. at 20-21. See text accompanying note 188 supra.
19 The SEC has proposed regulation of fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or
practices by security issuers registered under § 15(d) of the 1934 Act. See Proposed Amend-
ments, supra note 195, at 17-18. See note 184 supra.
19 See text accompanying notes 146-54 supra.
1 See text accompanying note 154 supra.
200 See Sherrard, supra note 149, at 724.
"'1 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1976); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 84 (1975).
102 See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORA-
TION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONs 415 (1976) [herein-
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disagree, however, arguing that because corporations are created by state
law, states should regulate corporate behavior. 03 The Delaware Supreme
Court's protection of frozen out shareholders in Singer and subsequent
cases contradicts the traditional argument that the federal government
must intervene in substantive corporate law because states have failed to
protect shareholders. 2° Adoption of freezeout standards alone would re-
present an undesirable piecemeal approach to the fundamental issue of
the proper roles of federal and state security regulation. Thus, short of a
major shift in state law,.freezeout regulation will remain in its current
bifurcated condition with mandatory disclosure under federal rules and
substantive regulation through state equity precedents.
20 5
SAMuEL A. FLAx
after cited as NADER, GREEN] (listing reasons for federal chartering of large corporation);
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701-03
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Cary] (advocating setting of federal minimum standards for cor-
porate behavior). See generally The Airlie House Symposium: An In-Depth Analysis of the
Federal & State Roles in Regulating Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAw. 863 (1976).
103 See, e.g., Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1976). Compare Letter
from John T. Hull, Acting Director Corporation & Securities Bureau, State of Michigan to
SEC, (Jan. 30, 1978) SEC File No. S7-729 (opposing federal intervention) with Letter from
Eugene G. Olson, Securities Administrator, State of Washington to SEC, (Jan. 24, 1978)
SEC File No. S7-729 (supporting federal regulation as model for state regulation).
204 See 1978 ABA Comment Letter, supra note 2, at 18-20; text accompanying notes 11-
18 supra. In a widely quoted article written before the Singer decision, Professor Cary
charged the Delaware courts aligned with management in most proxy contests and take-over
attempts. Cary, supra note 202, at 673. Cary concluded this alignment was part of a public
policy in Delaware to create a favorable climate for corporate management. Id. at 670; see
NADER, GREEN, supra note 202, at 51-70 (tracing development of pro-management attitude
in Delaware corporate law).
205 The SEC has indicated that future federal freezeout regulation efforts will depend
on state law developments. See 1979 Release, supra note 8, at E-2.
